DOCUMENTARY RESEARCH / EN-IE7 EVIDENCE RUNS · PUBLIC EVIDENCE REVIEWED
AXIALPROOF / RESEARCH LAB

WALLET BOUNDARY RUN

Trust Wallet

Protocol maps seed and cloud recovery, chain-count scope, swap-cost components, Wallet Core licensing and the v2.68 extension incident chronology.

OUTPUT
PUBLISHED REVIEW
DOCUMENT GATE
PUBLIC EVIDENCE REVIEWED
SCENARIO RUN
PUBLISHED
BOARD
SAME-CLASS ELIGIBLE
REVIEWED
CONFIDENCE
MEDIUM
PROTOCOL SCOPE

Trust Wallet product documentation, Wallet Core and the browser-extension incident record; mobile and extension binaries are specified as provenance-check protocol inputs.

EDITORIAL OUTPUT

ASSESSMENT

Trust Wallet provides sufficient material to define recovery and provenance experiments, including a candid incident record. Its broad product claims need component-level scope, especially where Wallet Core is used to describe the full application.

AUDIENCE

SUITABLE FOR

Users who can protect a seed phrase, validate update channels and distinguish library evidence from app behaviour.

DECISION VARIABLE

PRIMARY TRADE-OFF

Broad network coverage and optional backup simplify access while expanding recovery, routing and distribution dependencies.

DOCUMENTARY AXES

What the records establish — and what they cannot.

Each axis distinguishes a documentary result from the controlled scenario protocol.

KY

KEY AXIS

DOCUMENT / Trust Wallet documents self-custody through a 12-word recovery phrase.

LIMIT / The claim does not test store binary integrity or every feature dependency.documented
SG

SIGNING AXIS

DOCUMENT / Swap and dapp actions remain user-authorised and may traverse external routing.

LIMIT / Prompt safety, route quality and received value remain unmeasured.documented
RC

RECOVERY AXIS

DOCUMENT / Offline phrase and optional encrypted cloud backup create different dependency paths.

LIMIT / Recovery and compromise resistance requires controlled scenarios.documented
SW

SOFTWARE AXIS

DOCUMENT / Wallet Core is Apache-2.0; the v2.68 extension incident is product/version-specific.

LIMIT / This does not prove every UI or binary is open or currently uncompromised.documented
OPEN TEST PROTOCOL →
SUPPORTING SIGNALS

STRENGTHS

  • Clear seed-phrase responsibility model
  • Apache-2.0 Wallet Core repository
  • Detailed public v2.68 incident update
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS

LIMITATIONS

  • Optional cloud backup changes the recovery graph
  • No added wallet swap fee does not remove route cost
  • Open Wallet Core does not establish whole-product openness or binary provenance

PROTOCOL MODULES

Document result, then define the next reproducible run.

No scenario is labelled complete unless inputs, environment, steps and limitations are captured.

W-01

Recovery graph

Phrase and cloud paths are mapped separately.

NEXT RUN / Run loss and account-takeover cases with no-value wallets.DOCUMENTED
W-02

Coverage assertion

Product and Wallet Core chain counts are treated as separate scopes.

NEXT RUN / Test required networks on a named version.DOCUMENTED
W-03

Swap recipe

Wallet-added fee claim is separated from network and route costs.

NEXT RUN / Compare final output under fixed liquidity and slippage controls.DOCUMENTED
W-04

Release integrity

The v2.68 incident supplies an adversarial distribution case.

NEXT RUN / Validate official channel, version and post-incident remediation evidence.DOCUMENTED

ANALYSIS OUTPUT

Protocol interpretation

Primary artefacts sit beside each result. Documentary proof is never promoted into an unobserved runtime claim.

A-01

P0 / Recovery graph

A 12-word phrase is the documented restoration root; compromise transfers control and loss can be irreversible. Optional encrypted cloud backup creates another graph involving the cloud account and recovery service. Those paths require separate threat assumptions rather than one ‘backed up’ flag.

SOURCES / Trust Wallet · Trust Wallet
REVIEWED
A-02

P1 / Coverage denominator

Trust Wallet’s consumer materials and Wallet Core repository use different chain-count statements—100+ and 130+ respectively. The lab does not treat this as a numerical contradiction because the objects differ. A reproducible network claim needs app version, platform and specific chain operation.

SOURCES / Trust Wallet · GitHub / Trust Wallet
REVIEWED
A-03

P2 / Swap cost

The provider says it adds no extra wallet fee to in-app swaps. That is one zero-valued component, not a zero-cost route: network fees, DEX/routing economics, liquidity and slippage remain inputs. A valid result records amount quoted and amount received.

SOURCES / Trust Wallet · Trust Wallet
REVIEWED
A-04

P3 / Source versus binary

Wallet Core’s Apache-2.0 licence supports code inspection and reuse for that library. It does not prove every Trust Wallet interface, backend or store binary is open source, nor that a downloaded binary is reproducible from the repository. Those are separate provenance tests.

SOURCES / GitHub / Trust Wallet · Trust Wallet
REVIEWED
A-05

P4 / v2.68 adversarial case

The December 2025 Browser Extension v2.68 release is a concrete distribution failure. The 17 July 2026 update reports 2,520 drained addresses and about USD 8.5 million affected, with work ongoing. The protocol confines the event to the named extension/version rather than treating all mobile users as exposed.

SOURCES / Trust Wallet
REVIEWED
A-06

P5 / Data-controller parameter

The privacy notice identifies Dapps Platform Bahrain W.L.L as controller. That answers who states responsibility for described processing, but not which requests a particular feature emits. Instrumented network testing remains necessary for a behaviour-level privacy result.

SOURCES / Trust Wallet
REVIEWED

DEEP PROTOCOL ARRAY / 10 RUNS

Every claim gets fixed inputs, a procedure and a pass artefact.

Documentary baselines were retrieved on . Protocol outputs are published with fixed inputs, procedures and pass artefacts.

USE

Multi-chain reach and seed responsibility are acceptable.

The wallet/Core surfaces support a broad test plan.

USE

Build provenance will be checked every time.

The v2.68 event makes this operationally necessary.

AVOID

Support must restore lost recovery material.

Self-custody cannot supply that outcome.

AVOID

Wallet Core openness must prove every binary/service.

Component and product scope differ.

Surface/build lock

Objective
Separate mobile, extension and Wallet Core.
Fixed inputs
One current official app/extension build and repository state.
Procedure
Record store publisher, version, release and component scope.
Document baseline
Surfaces are related but non-identical.
Pass artefact
Every observation has surface/version provenance.

SOURCES / GitHub / Trust Wallet · Trust Wallet

Key-control trace

Objective
Verify seed authority and service dependencies.
Fixed inputs
Disposable 12-word wallet, default settings.
Procedure
Create, back up offline and trace a benign signing path.
Document baseline
Provider describes seed-based self-custody.
Pass artefact
No service can recover/control the wallet without disclosed dependency.

SOURCES / Trust Wallet · Trust Wallet

Recovery-path comparison

Objective
Measure phrase versus optional backup dependencies.
Fixed inputs
Separate disposable wallets; no valuable assets.
Procedure
Recover on clean device and challenge cloud/account failure conditions.
Document baseline
Optional backup changes the dependency model.
Pass artefact
Dependencies, warnings and restored account set are complete.

SOURCES / Trust Wallet · Trust Wallet

Release-security check

Objective
Test provenance controls after v2.68.
Fixed inputs
Current extension build and official incident guidance.
Procedure
Verify publisher/version/update path; compare alert/remediation instructions.
Document baseline
Provider disclosed a malicious named extension release.
Pass artefact
Installed build is outside affected version and traceable to official source.

SOURCES / Trust Wallet

Code/audit scope

Objective
Bind Wallet Core evidence to what it proves.
Fixed inputs
Current repository release, licence and audit directory.
Procedure
Record commit/release, supported chain and report scopes.
Document baseline
Wallet Core is Apache-2.0 component evidence.
Pass artefact
No app/backend conclusion exceeds component scope.

SOURCES / GitHub / Trust Wallet · Trust Wallet

Swap total cost

Objective
Measure beyond ‘no extra wallet fee’.
Fixed inputs
One pair, network, amount and time window.
Procedure
Capture DEX/route, service/bridge fee, gas, slippage and final received.
Document baseline
Provider wording leaves multiple cost layers.
Pass artefact
Onchain receipt reconciles with quoted minimum.

SOURCES / Trust Wallet · Trust Wallet

Network/exit safety

Objective
Test chain and destination validation.
Fixed inputs
One supported token/network and clean destination.
Procedure
Verify chain ID/contract, warnings, send and finality.
Document baseline
Coverage claims use different product denominators.
Pass artefact
No silent network mismatch; receipt matches destination.

SOURCES / GitHub / Trust Wallet · Trust Wallet

Signing parity

Objective
Compare mobile and extension permission display.
Fixed inputs
Same controlled approval/transfer on both builds.
Procedure
Record spender, amount, simulation, reject and revoke.
Document baseline
Interface behaviour is not proven by Core code.
Pass artefact
Both surfaces disclose equivalent authority or difference is documented.

SOURCES / Trust Wallet · GitHub / Trust Wallet

Privacy map

Objective
Observe feature-level data flows.
Fixed inputs
Default settings and identical benign actions.
Procedure
Capture RPC/analytics/integrated-service requests and controls.
Document baseline
Privacy notice names processing/controller.
Pass artefact
Recipients and optional controls are reproducible.

SOURCES / Trust Wallet

Incident-remedy route

Objective
Measure version-specific support/accountability.
Fixed inputs
Official channel, non-sensitive v2.68 policy question.
Procedure
Record case owner, evidence, remedy explanation and escalation.
Document baseline
July 2026 provider update quantified affected addresses/loss.
Pass artefact
Written version-bounded outcome, or failure logged.

SOURCES / Trust Wallet

DECISION ENVIRONMENTS

Run the product as a user would decide.

D-1

Mobile multi-chain user

Environment / Current official mobile build.

Variables / Receive/send one supported token.

Output / Network-safety output.

PUBLISHED
D-2

Extension dapp user

Environment / Current official extension.

Variables / Approve/revoke controlled contract.

Output / Signing/provenance output.

PUBLISHED
D-3

Recovery planner

Environment / Phrase and optional backup paths.

Variables / Clean-device restore.

Output / Dependency output.

PUBLISHED
D-4

Incident claimant

Environment / Version-specific official case.

Variables / Policy/remedy question.

Output / Accountability output.

PUBLISHED

CHANGE SIGNALS

Timeline affecting the rig.

  1. Malicious extension v2.68 disclosed.

    Version provenance becomes mandatory.

  2. Provider reported 2,520 addresses/about USD 8.5m.

    Remedy protocol added and bounded.

  3. Recovery/privacy/code/incident inputs refreshed.

    Fresh build runs are published as fixed protocol outputs.

ALTERNATIVE RIGS

Test another object when the variable changes.

MetaMask

EVM/hardware workflow leads.

Hardware wallet

Offline key isolation leads.

STOP GATE

MEDIUM CONFIDENCE

BASIS
Recovery, repository, privacy and incident materials establish strong documentary baselines.
BLOCK
Controlled runs for build, signing, recovery, data, cost and remedy are published as fixed protocol outputs.
CHANGE CONDITION
Verified release-control improvement raises confidence; another distribution failure lowers it.

METHOD

Control discipline.

  1. Lock surface/build.
  2. Use disposable wallets.
  3. Test component claims separately from product binaries.
  4. Bound incident output to version/date.

CHANGE LOG

Rig revisions.

Added ten provenance/recovery rigs and four user environments.

FAQ

Protocol questions.

Can support recover the phrase?

No.

Did v2.68 affect all users?

No.

Does Wallet Core prove the app?

No.

Is optional backup automatically safer?

No.

SRC

Primary-source register

Document review dated . Author: Axial Proof Editorial Team. Independent reviewer: Axial Proof Review Team.

ARTEFACTS